美国既没有(you)用之不竭的弹药(yao)，也(ye)没有(you)丰裕的时候。与伊朗停战不到两周，《金融时报》就报道(dao)称(cheng)，美国已斲丧了原本可用数年的关键弹药(yao)，其中包括大量“战斧”巡航导弹。而面对(dui)即(ji)将到来(lai)的美国中期(qi)推举，特(te)朗普也(ye)并无(wu)足(zu)够时候可言。

特(te)朗普目前几(ji)乎没有(you)挑(tiao)选：即(ji)使他宣(xuan)布胜利并希望就此撤兵，伊朗也(ye)不会善罢甘休。德黑(hei)兰已失(shi)无(wu)所失(shi)，能够利用其络绎不绝临盆的无(wu)人机和导弹，继续袭击以(yi)色(se)列以(yi)及位于(yu)其他国家的美军基地。

这场和平引出了一(yi)个关键问题：美国是不是拥有(you)一(yi)套连贯的国家战略(lue)？谜底是不是定的。若是说阿富汗和平是美国的一(yi)场“永久和平”，那末中东(dong)就是美国永久的战场。自20世纪80年代(dai)以(yi)来(lai)，美国已至少在该地区(qu)卷入六(liu)场和平。

Planet高清卫星图显示，伊朗击中了卡(ka)塔尔(er)“铺路爪(zhao)”雷达的一(yi)个阵面社交媒体

以(yi)色(se)列可谓(wei)美国的“死(si)穴(xue)”。鉴于(yu)紧密的美以(yi)关系(xi)和亲(qin)以(yi)游说团体的影响力，历届(jie)美国政府都支(zhi)持以(yi)色(se)列，区(qu)别仅在于(yu)支(zhi)持水平不同罢了。对(dui)美国而言，从中东(dong)脱身将比退(tui)出俄乌辩论(lun)更为(wei)艰(jian)难。从这个意义上说，以(yi)色(se)列的影响力凌驾了美国所有(you)欧洲(zhou)盟友之和。

以(yi)色(se)列是迄今为(wei)止的“赢家”，其呈报中的戎行伤(shang)亡人数低于(yu)美国（美军至少已有(you)13名士兵阵亡）。以(yi)色(se)列最大的成就是将美国拖入一(yi)场地区(qu)和平，以(yi)色(se)列总理(li)内(nei)塔尼亚胡暗示，这场辩论(lun)正(zheng)使以(yi)色(se)列崛起为(wei)全球超(chao)级大国。

然而，以(yi)色(se)列不会成为(wei)真(zhen)实的赢家。自2023年10月哈马斯袭击后，以(yi)色(se)列在加沙进行的不分青红(hong)皂白的大范围杀戮，使其国际形(xing)象急剧下降。巴勒(le)斯坦问题在全球20亿穆斯林（约占世界生齿25%）心(xin)中占据焦点职位。任何针对(dui)巴勒(le)斯坦人的不公，都将赢得全球穆斯林社会的抗议声(sheng)援，这是像以(yi)色(se)列这样的弹丸(wan)之国无(wu)法改(gai)变的现实。

别的，美国长期(qi)以(yi)来(lai)对(dui)以(yi)色(se)列的支(zhi)持似乎也(ye)在摆荡。根据盖洛普2月份的一(yi)项民意调查，同情巴勒(le)斯坦群众的美国人比例已凌驾同情以(yi)色(se)列人的比例。

特(te)朗普宣(xuan)布将他对(dui)中国的访问推迟“一(yi)个月左右(you)”并不使人不测。倘若他终究(jiu)成行，考(kao)虑到美国行动已对(dui)中国利益造成的损伤(shang)，我不知道(dao)他将如何向中方解释这场和平的合理(li)性。

如今，很少有(you)商船敢在极为(wei)危险的霍尔(er)木兹海峡水域飞行，而每次派遣美兵舰只为(wei)区(qu)区(qu)一(yi)两艘船只护航并不划算。特(te)朗普呼吁其他国家加入美国海军配合护航，但相应者寥寥。这与2008年发起的印度洋多国反海盗行动不同，当时包括中国在内(nei)的25个国家海军配合努力稳定了局势。

中国的丧失(shi)显而易见(jian)，但并非不可承(cheng)受(shou)，这从其相对(dui)稳定的股市中可见(jian)一(yi)斑。2025年，中国进口的原油中有(you)42%来(lai)自中东(dong)；而其中仅约13%来(lai)自伊朗。

近年来(lai)，中国通过扩大可再生动力应用范围，低落了对(dui)内(nei)部(bu)动力的依附。据彭博社援引中央电视台的报道(dao)，2025年中国的发电量是美国的两倍多，并远超(chao)欧盟、俄罗斯、印度和日本年度用电量的总和。

经(jing)过霍尔(er)木兹海峡的油轮(lun)遭到攻击半岛电视台

陈凯尔(er)2月份在《外交事件》杂志(zhi)上发表的一(yi)篇题为(wei)“中国正(zheng)在以(yi)静制动获胜”的文章认(ren)为(wei)，若是华盛顿继续其反复无(wu)常的国际举动，北京(jing)方面不会急于(yu)利用这一(yi)局势，因为(wei)无(wu)需这样做。此言不差。据报道(dao)，数十艘途经(jing)霍尔(er)木兹海峡的船只已更新其目标地信号，以(yi)注(zhu)解其船籍(ji)为(wei)中国或(huo)与中国相关。

这对(dui)北京(jing)而言是无(wu)意的告(gao)白：安全与中国相连，混乱(luan)与美国挂钩。1994年，美国总统国家安全事件助理(li)安东(dong)尼·莱克曾将朝鲜、古巴、伊朗、利比亚和伊拉克列为(wei)“流氓国家”。今天，伊朗和美国相比，谁的举动更像一(yi)个“流氓国家”？还有(you)哪位美国官员能继续奢谈“基于(yu)规则的国际秩序”？

特(te)朗普访华时候还不确定，但有(you)一(yi)件事是确定的：和平不会结束。他的自信或(huo)将处于(yu)低点。中国将一(yi)如既往地保(bao)持冷静。特(te)朗普的关税(shui)战压不垮中国群众，他空洞(dong)的逢迎也(ye)难以(yi)迷惑他们。

The eminent British military strategist Michael Howard famously said that the purpose of forecasting wars is not to get it right, but to avoid getting it terribly wrong. US President Donald Trump has already got it terribly wrong. No one knows why he launched a war with Israel against Iran.

Trump may have been partly correct when he posted on Truth Social that, “Iran’s Navy is gone, their Air Force is gone, missiles, drones and everything else are being decimated, and their leaders have been wiped from the face of the earth”. While clearly exaggerations, the US has inflicted heavy damage. Yet, he was clearly wrong in claiming, “We have unparalleled firepower, unlimited ammunition, and plenty of time.”

The US has neither unlimited ammunition nor plenty of time. Less than two weeks into the war with Iran, the Financial Times reported that the US had expended years’ worth of key munitions, including large numbers of Tomahawk cruise missiles. And Trump doesn’t have plenty of time ahead of the coming US midterm elections.

He has few options now: even if he did declare victory and wished merely to withdraw, Iran would not allow it. Tehran has little left to lose. Iran can keep striking Israel and US military bases in other countries using drones and missiles it can continuously produce.

This war raises a critical question: does the US have a coherent national strategy? The short answer is no. If the war in Afghanistan was one of the US’ “forever wars”, the Middle East is America’s permanent battlefield. Since the 1980s, the US has been involved in at least six wars in the region.

Israel is the US’ Achilles’ heel. Given the close US-Israel relationship and the influence of the pro-Israel lobby, successive US administrations have supported Israel, differing only in the degree of support. For the US, withdrawing from the Middle East will be harder than exiting the war in Ukraine. In this sense, Israel’s leverage exceeds that of all the US’ allies in Europe combined.

Israel is a winner so far. Reported casualties among its armed forces are lower than those of the US, which has lost at least 13 soldiers. Israel’s greatest achievement is dragging the US into a regional war. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has insinuated that the conflict is turning Israel into a global superpower.

Yet Israel won’t be the real winner. Its global image has deteriorated sharply since its massive and indiscriminate killing in Gaza following the Hamas attacks in October 2023. The Palestinian issue is central to the world’s 2 billion Muslims, who make up roughly 25 per cent of the global population. Any injustice against the Palestinians will draw support from the global Muslim community – a reality a small country like Israel cannot alter.

Moreover, the US’ long-standing support for Israel looks shaky. According to a Gallup poll in February, more Americans sympathise with the Palestinian people than with Israelis.

Trump’s announcement about delaying his China visit by “a month or so” is no surprise. If he does come, I wonder how he can justify the war to the Chinese leadership, given the harm US actions have inflicted on China’s interests.

Few commercial ships are now sailing through the extremely dangerous waters in the Strait of Hormuz, and deploying US warships to escort just one or two vessels each time is not cost-effective. Trump’s call for other countries to join the US Navy to escort ships has fallen on deaf ears. This is not like the multilateral anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean that were launched in 2008, when navies from over 25 countries including China joined efforts to stabilise the situation.

China’s losses are obvious, but not unbearable, as reflected in its relatively stable stock market. In 2025, 42 per cent of China’s imported crude oil came from the Middle East; only about 13 per cent of that total came from Iran.